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CASE COMMENT
Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet: The
Narrow Public Policy Exception to the
Terminable-At-Will Rule
I. INTRODUCTION
From June 1977, until his termination in May, 1980, Charles J.
Brockmeyer held a management position in the credit services di-
vision of Dun & Bradstreet.1 He had no contract of employment.
When Brockmeyer's former secretary filed a sex discrimination
claim against Dun & Bradstreet, the company asked Brockmeyer
to submit a written report concerning the course of events that led
to her resignation. Brockmeyer refused because "he feared he
would become Dun & Bradstreet's scapegoat for the alleged dis-
crimination actions taken against his former secretary. "2
Brockmeyer also stated that he would be canaid about the incident
if called to testify at a hearing or trial. Dun & Bradstreet settled
the claim with the former secretary and fired Brockmeyer.
At the time of the discharge, Dun & Bradstreet offered
Brockmeyer $8,500 if he would sign a release agreeing not to sue
the company.3 Brockmeyer refused the offer and initiated a wrong-
ful discharge action against the company. He also sought damages
on an intentional infliction of emotional harm theory. Dun & Brad-
street, however, claimed that they terminated Brockmeyer because
he smoked marijuana in front of the employees, did not attend to
job duties, had an open affair with his secretary, and precipitated a
low morale among the employees in his office.4
1. Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 113 Wis. 2d 561, 564, 335 N.W.2d 834, 836 (Ct.
App. 1983).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 565, 335 N.W.2d at 836-37. The court noted that Brockmeyer freely admitted
the first three allegations at a meeting with his supervisors but that he assured them the
situation would improve. Id. at 564, 335 N.W.2d at 836. An initial reading of these facts
supports the finding of the court of appeals and the supreme court. Neither court, however,
adequately addressed the secretary's sex discrimination claim or Brockmeyer's reasons for
not submitting a report on the incident. The jury found for Brockmeyer. Unless they based
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In the Circuit Court for Milwaukee County, the jury found
that Dun & Bradstreet had wrongfully discharged Brockmeyer and
awarded him $250,000 in compensatory damages and $250,000 in
punitive damages. The jury rejected Brockmeyer's claim for inten-
tional infliction of emotional harm. On appeal, the court held that
"recovery will be permitted if termination offends clearly defined
public policy, or results from the exercise of bad faith, or results
from malicious or retaliatory activity on the part of the em-
ployer. ' ' 5 The court of appeals reversed the judgment and re-
manded the case with instructions to dismiss the complaint on the
merits because the record contained insufficient evidence to sus-
tain Brockmeyer's claim that the company wrongfully discharged
him. The Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed, holding that an em-
ployee has a cause of action for wrongful discharge when the dis-
charge is contrary to a fundamental and well-defined public policy
as evidenced by a constitutional or statutory provision.
Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 113 Wis. 2d 561, 335 N.W.2d
834 (1983).
II. PRIOR LAW AND'THE EFFORT OF THE Brockmeyer DECISION
The principal issue in Brockmeyer is whether Wisconsin has
any judicial exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine. Exami-
nation of the development and modifications of the at-will doctrine
reveals the narrowness of Wisconsin's public policy exception, and
isolates the issues and problems facing any court that must choose
between adherence to or departure from a rigid and outmoded
rule.
The employment-at-will doctrine supplanted English employ-
ment law. The Statute of Labourers' provided that "no master can
put away his servant" during or at the end of his term of employ-
ment and that apprentices could be dismissed only upon "reasona-
ble cause."'7 The statute influenced the English courts and the law
their verdict entirely on sympathy and prejudice, there is an inference that Dun & Brad-
street acted improperly. See infra text accompanying notes 63-64. Also, Dun & Bradstreet
offered Brockmeyer a settlement in exchange for a covenant not to sue. This may support
the inference of oppressive conduct by the company as well.
5. Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 109 Wis. 2d 44, 46-47, 325 N.W.2d 70, 72 (Wis. Ct.
App. 1982) (footnote omitted).
6. 5 Eliz., ch.4 (1562).
7. W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 425-26 (1969) (footnotes omitted). For a discussion
of the development of the at-will rule in England, see Feinman, The Development of the
Employment at Will Rule, 20 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 118, 119-22 (1976); Murg and Scharman,
Employment At Will: Do the Exceptions Overwhelm the Rule?, 23 B.C.L. REV. 329, 332-33
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of employment relations. The courts determined that when an em-
ployment contract contained the mention of an annual salary, the
employer implicitly agreed to a one-year term of employment un-
less there was reasonable cause to discharge. This rule made it
difficult for an employer to dismiss an employee without breaching
the contract and incurring liability.
American courts originally followed the English rule. In the
late nineteenth century,9 however, the advent of the industrial
revolution and the growth of a laissez-faire spirit changed the na-
ture of employment relations. Responding to these societal
changes, the American courts departed from the English rule and
created the employment-at-will doctrine. The nineteenth century
climate also fostered a reverence for individual freedom of choice
and action that translated into an opposition to governmental in-
terference with economic affairs. In addition, the rapid growth of
industry witnessed a depersonalization of the employment rela-
tionship. Thus, employers began to assume less responsibility for
their employees' work conditions and job security. 10 Also, courts
relied on formalistic contract doctrines and only enforced employ-
ers' promises that were definite and express. As a result, employers
were liable only when they breached promises to which they clearly
and unequivocably intended to be bound. The courts restricted lia-
bility in order to promote the growth of business and encourage
employees to assume the risks of an enterprise.
Horace Wood's 1877 Treatise on the Law of Master and Ser-
(1982); Note, Protecting At Will Employees Against Wrongful Discharge: The Duty to Ter-
minate Only in Good Faith, 93 HARv. L. REV. 1816, 1814-28 (1980) [hereinafter cited as
Note, Protecting At Will Employees]; Note, Implied Contract Rights to Job Security, 26
STAN. L. REV. 335, 340-45 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Note, Implied Contract Rights]; Note,
Limiting the Right to Terminate At Will-Have the Courts Forgotten the Employer?, 35
VAND. L. REV. 201, 205-10 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Note, Limiting the Right to
Terminate].
8. Brockmeyer, 113 Wis. 2d at 566, 335 N.W.2d at 837 (footnote omitted); see also Tur-
ner v. Robinson, 5 B. & Ad. 791, 110 Eng. Rep. 982 (K.B. 1833) (where there is an annual
stated salary the usual presumption is that the employment term is one year). See generally
Annot., 11 A.L.R. 469, 470 (1921) (discussion of the general rule on terms of employment
and the English cases that follow the rule).
9. For a discussion of the development of the American rule within the laissez-faire
climate, see Murg and Scharman, supra note 7, at 333-35; Summers, Individual Protection
Against Unjust Dismissal: Time for a Statute, 62 VA. L. REV. 481, 485 (1976); Note, Im-
plied Contract Rights, supra note 7, at 340-43; Note, Limiting the Right to Terminate,
supra note 7, at 205-10.
10. See Murg and Scharman, supra note 7, at 334; Note, Protecting At Will Employ-
ees, supra note 7, at 1824.
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vant," the leading authority on employment relations, agreed with
the promotion of industrial growth and the protection of freedom-
of-contract espoused by the American courts. Wood stated that
unless the understanding between the parties "was mutual that the
service was to extend for a certain fixed and definite period, it is an
indefinite hiring and is determinable at the will of either party."12
The earliest crystallized American rule appeared in Payne v. The
Western & Atlantic Railroad Co. 3 The court held: "All [employ-
ers] may dismiss their employees at-will, be they many or few, for
good cause, for no cause or even for cause morally wrong, without
being thereby guilty of legal wrong."' 4 Under this rule, the em-
ployer did not assume the burden of proving that the parties in-
tended a contract duration of less than a year. Instead, the em-
ployee had to establish that his service was intended to extend for
a definite period.
By the turn of the nineteenth century the at-will doctrine,
protected by the interest in preserving freedom of contract,
achieved constitutional proportions. In Adair v. United States,15
the United States Supreme Court invalidated a federal statute that
made it a criminal offense for a carrier engaged in interstate com-
merce to discharge an employee simply because of the employee's
membership in a labor organization. The Court found that the
statute invaded personal liberty and interfered with the right of
property guaranteed by the fifth amendment to the Constitution.
The Court explained that
in the absence, however, of a valid contract between the parties
controlling their conduct towards each other and fixing a period
of service, it cannot be ... that an employer is under any legal
obligation against his will, to retain an employee in his personal
service any more than an employee can be compelled, against
his will, to remain in the personal service of another.'
Shortly thereafter, in Coppage v. Kansas,'7 the United States Su-
preme Court invalidated a Kansas statute that declared it a misde-
11. H. WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT § 134, at 272 (1877).
For a discussion of Wood's rule and its justification, see Note, Implied Contract Rights,
supra note 7, at 341-43.
12. Id.
13. 81 Tenn. 507 (1884), overruled on other grounds, Hutton v. Watters, 132 Tenn. 527,
179 S.W. 134 (1915).
14. Payne, 81 Tenn. at 519-20 (1884).
15. 208 U.S. 161 (1908).
16. Id. at 175.
17. 236 U.S. 1 (1915).
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meanor punishable by fine or imprisonment for an employer to re-
quire an employee to agree not to become or remain a member of
any labor organization during the time of employment."8 The
Court found that the employer's right to hire and fire at-will was a
property right protected by the Constitution.
After the Adair and Coppage decisions, the state and federal
legislatures became increasingly aware of the disparity in bargain-
ing power between employer and employee. In the 1930's the Court
withdrew its support from the rigid view that Congress could not
interfere with the employer's discretionary discharges. In NLRB v.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,'" the Court upheld Congress' au-
thority to safeguard the right of employees in a manufacturing
plant to organize and select representatives for collective bargain-
ing. The Court, however, clearly expressed respect for the termina-
ble-at-will doctrine when it stated that the National Labor Rela-
tions Act did not interfere with the normal right of the employer
to hire, or with the right of discharge when exercised for other rea-
sons than intimidation and coercion. 20 Although the at-will doc-
trine remained intact, the National Labor Relations Act marked
the beginning of increased regulation of the work place.
Along with the efforts to protect the employee from the em-
ployer's abuse of power and to stabilize labor relations in general,
legislatures enacted numerous statutes that eroded the effect of
the at-will rule.2' Yet, despite the over-abundance of legislation
mitigating the harsh and absolute application of the at-will doc-
trine, many employees still are not unionized or do not fall within
18. Id. at 26.
19. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
20. Id. at 45-46.
21. In the private sector, state and federal regulations protect union members, National
Labor Relations Act of 1935, 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1982); Wisconsin Employment Peace Act,
Wis. Stat. § 111.06(1)(c)(1) (1975); veterans, 38 U.S.C. §§ 2021-22 (1976 & Supp. V 1982);
and debtors, Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1674(a) (1982). Also, statutes and
ordinances make it unlawful for an employer to discharge an employee because of race,
color, religion, sex, natural origin, or age. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2 (1976 & Supp. V 1982). Furthermore, employment practices and procedures pro-
tect employees in the public sector and civil service provisions permit dismissal of the public
employee only for just cause. Statutes also protect political activists and jurors. In addition,
certain statutes prevent employers from attempting to control the votes of employees or
from forcing an employee to take a lie detector test. Finally, there is statutory protection for
at-will employees who testify at a minimum wage law proceeding and who suffer worker's
compensation illness or injury. For a general discussion of these statutes, see Brockmeyer,
113 Wis. 2d at 567-68 & n.9, 335 N.W.2d at 837-38 & n.9; Summers, supra note 9, at 492-95;
Note, Protecting At Will Employees, supra note 7, at 1816 & n.1 cited in Note, Limiting
the Right to Terminate, supra note 7, at 201 n.1.
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a statutorily protected class.22
In addition to these legislative efforts to regulate the work
place, the common law has developed limitations to the at-will rule
which roughly fall into three categories. First, a distinct minority
rule is the imposition upon an employer of an implied duty to ter-
minate an employee only in good faith. In Fortune v. National
Cash Register Co.,23 a former salesman brought an action against a
former employer to recover bonuses allegedly due for the sales the
employee made. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
stated that parties to contracts or commercial transactions are
bound by the standard of good faith and fair dealing. The court
applied this to employment contracts and found- that the termina-
tion made in bad faith in order to prevent the salesman from col-
lecting bonuses constituted a breach of contract.
A second approach the courts have taken to modify the at-will
doctrine is the enforcement of statements contained in personnel
policy manuals. In Toussiant v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield,24 two
employees commenced actions against their former employers
claiming that the discharges violated their employment agree-
ments. The employers not only orally promised the employees that
they could expect job security if they did their work, but a policy
handbook guaranteed that they could only be discharged for just
cause. The court held that these written statements of policy gave
rise to contractual rights. It stated that through these practices
and policies, "[t]he employer secures an orderly, cooperative and
loyal work force."'25 In addition, the court believed the employee
gains peace of mind and a sense of job security. The statements in
the handbook make pre-employment negotiations unnecessary.
The employer, through stated policies, practices, and goals creates
"a situation 'instinct with an obligation.' ",26 The Toussiant ap-
proach provides the nonunion private sector employee protection
from employers who make express representations and then refuse
to be bound by them.217
22. See The Development of Exceptions to At-Will Employment: A Review of the
Case Law From Management's Viewpoint, 51 CIN. L. REV. 616 (1982); Note, Protecting At
Will Employees, supra note 7, at 1816; Note, Limiting the Right to Terminate, supra note
7, at 201.
23. 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977).
24. 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980).
25. Id. at 613, 292 N.W.2d at 892.
26. Id. (footnote omitted).
27. See also Jackson v. Minidoka Irrigation Dist., 98 Idaho 330, 563 P.2d 54 (1977);
Weiner v. McGraw Hill, 57 N.Y.2d 458, 443 N.E.2d 441, 457 N.Y.S.2d 193 (1982). As a result
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A third and most significant erosion of the at-will doctrine is
the public policy exception. The broadest application of this excep-
tion appears in Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co.28 In that case a female
employee was terminated when she refused to respond to her fore-
man's advances. She sued to recover damages for alleged breach of
an oral contract of employment. The New Hampshire Supreme
Court held "that a termination by the employer of a contract of
employment at-will which is motivated by bad faith or malice or
based on retaliation is not [in] the best interest of the economic
system or the public good and constitutes a breach of the employ-
ment contract. '29 In the opinion, the court did not cite a constitu-
tional provision or statute to define what constitutes "public
good." Instead, the court suggested a balancing of three interests:
the "employer's interest in running his business as he sees fit," the
employee's interest "in maintaining his employment," and "the
public's interest in maintaining a proper balance between the
two." 0 The Monge court's rule is broader than the rule promul-
gated by the courts that require that discharges violate clear ex-
pressions of public policy.
Within the narrower public policy exception cases, there are
four overlapping situations that arise. First, courts apply the pub-
lic policy exception to cases where employers fire employees who
refuse to violate a criminal statute. In a leading California case,
Petermann v. Teamsters Local 396, '31 an employer instructed an
employee to testify falsely before a legislative committee. The em-
ployer fired the employee when he insisted on giving correct and
of this approach, employers are attempting to remove such promises or statements from
handbooks and manuals; see, e.g., Brown, Limiting Your Risks in the New Russian Rou-
lette-Discharging Employees, 8 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 380, 391-92 (1982-1983).
28. 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974). The New Hampshire court found that a termi-
nation motivated by bad faith is not in the best interest of our economy or the public good.
Monge who in 1968 worked for $1.84 per hour on a conversion machine in the factory recov-
ered her lost wages amounting to $1,416.20.
29. Id. at 133, 316 A.2d at 551.
30. Id. New Hampshire retreated from this position in Howard v. Dorr Woolen Co., 120
N.H. 295, 414 A.2d 1273 (1980). Howard found that Monge only applies "to a situation
where an employee is discharged because he performed an act that public policy would en-
courage, or refused to do that which public policy would condemn." Id. at 297, 414 A.2d at
1274. In Cloutier v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 121 N.H. 915, 436 A.2d 1140 (1980),
the court said that Howard had limited Monge and established a two-part test: first, the
employee must show that the employer was motivated by bad faith, malice, or retaliation;
second, an employee must prove that the discharge is in violation of public policy. See also
The Development of Exceptions, supra note 22, at 623-24.
31. 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959). But see Ivy v. Army Times Publishing
Co., 428 A.2d 831 (D.C. 1981).
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truthful answers to all the questions. The court held that in order
to more fully effectuate the state's policy against perjury, civil law
will deny the employer's generally unlimited right to discharge an
employee. The court believed that a company that makes contin-
ued employment contingent upon the commission of a felony bla-
tantly encourages criminal conduct.
Second, some courts recognize the public policy exception in
situations where the employee is discharged for refusal to violate a
noncriminal statute. In the West Virginia case of Harless v. First
National Bank,32 a former at-will bank employee alleged that his
discharge was in retaliation for his attempts to require his em-
ployer to operate in compliance with the state and federal con-
sumer credit protection laws. The court found that such a dis-
charge frustrates the public policy that consumers of credit
covered by the act were to be given protection. Furthermore, in
Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc.,33 the Connecticut Supreme
Court found that a quality control director, hired at-will, suffi-
ciently alleged a cause of action for wrongful discharge. The em-
ployee claimed that the employer dismissed him in retaliation for
his insistence that the company comply with the requirements of
the Food, Drugs and Cosmetics Act.
Third, in some cases judicially conceived notions of public pol-
icy fall within the rubric of this exception. In an Illinois case,
Palmateer v. International Harvester Co.,34 an employer fired an
employee for supplying information to local law enforcement au-
thorities. The employee disclosed that a colleague might be in-
volved in criminal activities and he offered to assist in the investi-
gation and trial. The court said: "[P]ublic policy concerns what is
right and just and what affects the citizens of the State collec-
tively. It is to be found in the State's constitution and statutes
and, when they are silent, in its judicial decisions. ' 35 Although no
specific constitutional provision or statute required individuals to
participate in the battle against crime, the court found a general
public policy favoring "citizen crimefighters. ' 3 The Illinois court
rejected the employer's contention that this application of the pub-
lic policy exception is too broad and that it allows employees to
32. 246 S.E.2d 270 (W. Va. 1978).
33. 179 Conn. 471, 427 A.2d 385 (1980). But see Geary v. United States Steel, 456 Pa.
171, 319 A.2d 174 (1974).
34. 85 Ill. 2d 124, 421 N.E.2d 876 (1981).
35. Id. at 130, 421 N.E.2d at 878.
36. Id. at 132, 421 N.E.2d at 880.
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"recklessly and precipitously [resort] to the criminal justice system
to handle . . . personnel problem[s]." 37
Fourth, a narrower public policy exception includes cases
where employers fire employees who exercise a statutory right. In
an Indiana case, Frampton v. Central Indiana Gas Co.,38 an em-
ployee injured herself while working. Her employer fired her after
she filed a workmen's compensation claim and received a settle-
ment for her injury. The court explained that the acts were
designed to afford injured workers an adequate and expeditious
remedy. 9 It noted that such legislation shifts the economic burden
for work injuries from the employee to the employer. The court
found that a retaliatory discharge that counters the effect of the
act is unconscionable. Therefore, it recognized that an exception to
the at-will rule arises when an employee is discharged solely for
exercising a right conferred by statute.
Courts also recognize a cause of action for employees who are
fired for complying with the statutory duty of jury service. In Nees
v. Hocks,40 employers requested that an employee ask to be dis-
missed from jury duty because they could not spare her for a whole
month. When the employers discovered that she had not sought to
be relieved of her service, they fired her. The employee brought an
action to recover compensatory and punitive damages. The Oregon
Supreme Court concluded that "there can be circumstances in
which an employer discharges an employee for such a socially un-
desirable motive that an employer must respond in damages for
any injury done. ' 41 The court examined Oregon's constitution,
statutes, and case law and found clear indications of a community
interest in having citizens perform jury duty. Therefore the court
imposed liability on the employers for the compensatory damages.
Unfortunately, this narrow approach to modifying the at-will
doctrine leads to an extreme reluctance on the part of the courts to
provide redress for the wrongfully discharged employee. Some
states merely recognize the exception in principle without actually
applying it. They take a strict position in regard to the policies
that support an action for wrongful discharge and effectively deny
the employee the protection of an availing exception. In Pennsyl-
37. Id. at 133, 421 N.E.2d at 880.
38. 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973).
39. Id. at 250, 297 N.E.2d at 427.
40. 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975).
41. Id. at 218, 536 P.2d at 515.
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vania's Geary v. United States Steel Corp.,42 a former salesman
for a steel manufacturer brought an action against his former em-
ployer seeking damages for wrongful discharge. The employee be-
lieved that the company's product was unsafe, but when he ex-
pressed his doubts to his superiors, they ordered him to "follow
directions." '43 Although he agreed to comply with their instruc-
tions, he eventually complained to a vice president who reevalu-
ated the product and withdrew it from the market."' Immediately
thereafter, the superiors discharged the employee without notice.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the employee at-will
has no right of action against an employer for wrongful discharge
when no clear mandate of public policy is violated. The court
noted the "praiseworthiness of Geary's motives, 45 but they ex-
pressed that these motives did "not detract from the company's
legitimate interest in preserving its normal operational procedures
from disruption. ' 46 The court agreed in principle that employees
should be "encouraged to express their educated views '47 on the
quality and safety of company products. Nevertheless, the court
was not "persuaded that creating a new non-statutory cause of ac-
tion . . . is the best way to achieve this result."4
The New Jersey Supreme Court expressed a similar reluctance
to actually apply the public policy exception in Pierce v. Ortho
Pharmaceutical Corp.49 A medical doctor employed by a drug
manufacturing company refused to work on developing a
saccharine product because she felt that the work would violate
her Hippocratic Oath. The court stated that at-will employees
seeking to recover for wrongful discharge must identify "a specific
expression of public policy" on which to base their claims.50 The
court found that under the circumstances, the oath did not contain
a clear mandate of public policy: "a code of ethics designed to
serve only the interests of a profession or an administrative regula-
tion concerned with technical matters probably would not be suffi-
42. 456 Pa. 171, 319 A.2d 174 (1974). For a discussion of this case, see Summers, supra
note 9, at 281-82.
43. Geary, 456 Pa. at 173, 319 A.2d at 175.
44. Id. at 173-74, 319 A.2d at 175.
45. Id. at 183, 319 A.2d at 180.
46. Id. (footnote omitted).
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. 84 N.J. 58, 417 A.2d 505 (1980).
50. Id. at 72, 417 A.2d at 512.
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cient."51 Moreover, the court reasoned that to hold otherwise
would discourage drug manufacturers from developing new drugs
in accord with their best judgment.2
III. THE Brockmeyer COURT'S REASONING
The decision in Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet53 falls within
the narrow approach to the public policy exception. Initially, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court considered Brockmeyer's contention
that the court should adopt the good faith theory. The court re-
fused to impose such a duty to terminate in good faith upon the
employer for two reasons-the difficulty of defining "bad faith"
and the undesirability of "unduly restrict[ing] an employer's dis-
cretion in managing the work force. '54 In support of the former
reason, the court cited a Hawaii case, Parnar v. Americana Hotels,
Inc.," in which an employee brought an action alleging that her
employer discharged her in order to induce her to leave the juris-
diction and prevent her from testifying before a grand jury investi-
gating antitrust violations. The Hawaii Supreme Court rejected the
good faith exception because this would "seem to subject each dis-
charge to judicial incursions into the amorphous concept of bad
faith."5 6
The Brockmeyer court not only reasoned that the adoption of
this exception imposes an added burden on the courts, but also
suggested that the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
interferes with the employment relationship.57 Underlying a rejec-
tion of the good faith duty is a fear that the requirement that an
employer may terminate an employee only for "just cause" will
transfer from the employee to the employer the uncertainty con-
cerning continued employment. Although this approach gives the
employee a sense of job security, it could inhibit employers from
exercising their freedom in making personnel choices and changes.
These hiring and firing decisions that are often confidential can
shape the direction of a company and promote the growth of the
economy at large. In a jurisdiction where Fortune"8 has preceden-
51. Id.
52. Id. at 76, 417 A.2d at 514.
53. 113 Wis. 2d 561, 335 N.W.2d 834 (Wis. 1983).
54. Id. at 569, 335 N.W.2d at 838.
55. 65 Hawaii 370, 652 P.2d 625 (1982).
56. Id. at 377, 652 P.2d 629.
57. Brockmeyer, 113 Wis. 2d at 569, 335 N.W.2d at 838.
58. Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977). For a
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tial value, an employer must be sure that he or she can justify each
termination. It is possible that the Brockmeyer court and others
like it hope to avoid creating a situation where employers will, con-
trary to the best interest of the company, elect to retain an em-
ployee rather than face the costs of defending a wrongful discharge
action. The Brockmeyer court, however, did not carefully weigh'
these potential burdens on and costs to the employer against the
unfairness to the employee, who cannot expect "good faith and fair
dealing" with respect to the job. While undue restriction on the
employer's freedom to hire and fire may not encourage business
growth, the absence of job security and the collective adverse im-
pact on employee morale also does not promote economic health.
Instead of accepting the "good faith" theory, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court adopted the public policy exception. It defined
public policy broadly as "community common sense and common
conscience. ' 5" Therefore, a "wrongful discharge is actionable when
the termination clearly contravenes the public welfare and gravely
violates paramount requirements of public interest."60 The court,
however, limited the concept of public welfare to those interests
reflected in the provisions of and amendments to the constitution
and statutes, and suggested that only these explicit declarations of
public policy are "inherently incorporated into every employment
at-will relationship. 6 1 The court never explored why the at-will re-
lationship incorporates only constitutional and statutory expres-
sions of policy and not those more nebulous notions of "commu-
nity common sense" and "common conscience." Within the
parameters of the Brockmeyer modification of the at-will doctrine,
an actionable wrongful discharge is extremely narrow: "An em-
ployee cannot be fired for refusing to violate the constitution or a
statute."62
At this point, it is interesting to speculate on the basis for the
jury verdict in the lower court. At trial, the judge instructed the
jury that a terminated employee can recover damages from his or
her employer "'where the discharge violates some clear and spe-
cific public policies or where the discharge is retaliatory or is moti-
vated by bad faith or malice.' "6" The jury's award of $250,000 in
discussion of Fortune, see text accompanying note 28.
59. 113 Wis. 2d at 573, 335 N.W.2d at 840.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 565-66, 335 N.W.2d at 837.
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compensatory damages and $250,000 in punitive damages suggest
two possibilities: the verdict could have been the result of the ju-
rors' excessive sympathy with the plight of the employee or could
have been the product of a real community sense that the em-
ployer violated public policy. If we accept the latter as the predom-
inant basis behind the verdict, then the award below indicates that
there are public interests and policies that transcend the contours
of the qualified definition of "public policy" forged by the Wiscon-
sin Supreme Court. A narrow public policy exception appears more
predictable and manageable. Nevertheless, the narrow approach
fails to acknowledge legitimate public concerns and notions of pub-
lic welfare not yet embodied in constitutions and statutes.
The court also confronted another difficult question encoun-
tered by courts that modify the harsh at-will rule: Should the
wrongfully discharged employee maintain an action in tort or con-
tract? The cases that apply the "good faith" theory sound in con-
tract, 4 whereas most of the states that have the public policy ex-
ception recognize a tort action.65 A clear exposition of the tort
action in wrongful discharge situations appears in Tameny v. At-
lantic Richfield Co. 66
In Tameny, an employee brought action against an employer
who discharged him for refusing to participate in an illegal scheme
to fix gasoline prices. The California Supreme Court held that the
employee could maintain a tort action. It rejected the employer's
argument that because the parties' relationship is contractual in
nature, improper termination actions are only based on breach of
contract.6 7 The court pointed out that "'[tjhe days when a servant
was practically the slave of his master have long since passed.' "68
The court also noted that the employer is not an absolute "sover-
eign of the job" that may condition continued employment upon
64. See, e.g., Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251
(1977); Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974). For a discussion of
these cases, see text accompanying notes 23 & 28-30, respectively.
65. See Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr.
839 (1980); Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 Il. 2d 124, 421 N.E.2d 876 (1981);
Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973); Harless v. First
Nat'l Bank in Fairmont, 246 S.E.2d 270 (W. Va. 1978). But see Petermann v. Teamsters
Local 396, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959) (this was a contract action); Pierce v.
Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 N.J. 58, 417 A.2d 505 (1980) (recognizing that wrongful
discharge actions within the public policy exception can sound in either tort or contract).
66. 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1980).
67. Id. at 174, 610 P.2d at 1334, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 843.
68. Id. at 178, 610 P.2d at 1336, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 845 (citation omitted).
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the employee's participation in unlawful conduct. 9 Furthermore,
the employer's obligation to refrain from firing an employee who
refuses to break the law "reflects a duty imposed by law upon all
employers in order to implement the fundamental public policies
embodied in the state's penal statutes. 70 The court recognized
that such a suit "exhibits the classic elements of a tort cause of
action. ' 71 The court examined the protected interests in order to
reach its conclusion. It stated that contract actions protect " 'the
interest in having promises performed' ",72 and tort actions " 'pro-
tect the interest in freedom from various kinds of harm.' 73
The Brockmeyer court, however, rejected the prophylactic ap-
proach of Tameny. Instead, the court emphasized the remedial dis-
tinctions between the two causes of action pointing out that dam-
ages in tort are limited only by the notions of "proximate cause" or
by considerations of public policy. 74 Furthermore, the court noted
that "punitive damages are also allowed ' 75 in tort actions. In con-
trast, the court found that the concepts of foreseeability and miti-
gation limit damages in contract actions.7 6 The court examined the
wrongful discharge statutes in Wisconsin and found that the ma-
jority of statutes established the contractual remedies of reinstate-
ment and backpay. It concluded that contract remedies are the
most appropriate form of relief in the public policy exception
wrongful discharge actions, and that in Wisconsin, the employee
cannot bring an action in tort to recover for wrongful discharge.
The court reasoned that "[t]he contract action is essentially predi-
cated on the breach of an implied provision that an employer will
not discharge an employee for refusing to perform an act that vio-
lates a clear mandate of public policy. '77
The court's determination that a wrongfully discharged em-
ployee must bring an action in contract ignores two realities of em-
ployment in American society: the structure of the labor market
and the importance of work to the average individual. First, the
69. Id.
70. Id. at 176, 610 P.2d at 1335, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 844.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. (citation omitted).
74. 113 Wis. 2d at 575, 335 N.W.2d at 841.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. In contrast, the courts that recognize a tort cause of action for violations of
public policy perceive the discharge as a breach of a duty to uphold the law.
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dual market theorists note that there are two labor markets.7" Pri-
mary-level jobs are managerial positions that pay favorable wages
and offer job stability. Secondary-level positions lack power, pay
low wages and produce little, if any, expectation of job security. A
recent note in the Harvard Law Review points out that these
lower-level employees receive little benefit from any public policy
exception. 7 Furthermore, these employees often find that a public
policy exception sounding in contract is completely unavailing."0
Even if lower-level employees decide to bring an action against the
discharging employer, they must deal with the high cost of legal
services.8' Unfortunately, there is no incentive for an attorney to
accept the lower-level employee as a client on a contingent-fee ba-
sis because the employee's recovery is limited to their meager lost
earnings. Also, wage recovery is often subject to a duty to mitigate,
the employee must seek and, if possible, procure alternate
employment.
Nevertheless, secondary-level employees possess a better
chance of recovery if they file a suit in a state that allows tort ac-
tions. Although there are many restrictions on recovery,82 a tort
action allows at least some possibility of punitive damages, dam-
ages for pain and suffering and reimbursement of the expense of
the suit.83 Not only is the tort action more favorable to secondary-
level employees, but its continued use might also improve the long-
range conditions in the secondary market. Its use could ultimately
mean more job stability and better working conditions. Although
the approach could impose greater costs on the employer, the pres-
ence of less obvious reciprocal benefits may lessen the employer's
burden. For instance, a secondary work force that perceives a
greater sense of job security may invest more creative energies in
their work. The increased job awareness may lead to greater effi-
ciency and greater productivity.
Second, a wrongful discharge action that only sounds in con-
tract ignores another reality of employment in American soci-
ety-work and life are often inextricably combined. 4 A disturb-
78. See Note, Protecting Employees At Will Against Wrongful Discharge: The Public
Policy Exception, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1931 (1983).
79. Id.
80. See id. at 1942-44.
81. See id.
82. See id. at 1944.
83. See W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 9 (4th ed. 1971).
84. For a discussion of the employee's need for a personal damage remedy, see Blades,
Employment At Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive Exercise of Em-
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ance "in the office" frequently breaks through the boundaries of
the employment context and poisons other aspects of the individ-
ual's life. The fired employees are sometimes stigmatized. They
must search for a new job and their efforts are often thwarted by
the overall lack of available jobs. Furthermore, their opportunities
are frustrated, if not altogether impeded, by the failure implied in
losing a previous position. Even when the quest proves successful,
the employee may compromise and work at a lower salary, accept a
less prestigious title, or relocate in another town or state.
Regardless of its effect on the employee's job status and
chances for recovery, a wrongful termination affects the employee
on an emotional level as well. Even the stoic experience mental
stress and anguish caused by an abusive firing. Moreover, the dis-
ruption frequently impairs the individual's physical well being. An-
other important consideration is that the repercussions of a wrong-
ful termination are often exacerbated by the situation inherent in
the public policy context. An employee fired for refusing to break
the law, or for complying with a statutory provision, or for at-
tempting to save the public from a dangerous product may experi-
ence an even greater sense of injustice and unfairness which only
adds to the strain.
Tort actions provide adequate redress for the emotional and
physical injuries that accompany a wrongful discharge. Tort law
compensates "individuals for injuries sustained as the result of the
unreasonable conduct of another" and therefore, tends to have a
precautionary effect.85 In addition, the recovery of punitive dam-
ployer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404, 1413-16 (1967). See also Comerford v. International
Harvester Co., 235 Ala. 376, 178 So. 894 (1938). In Comerford, the employee alleged that:
[he] was greatly humiliated and embarrassed, and was caused to suffer great
mental anguish and was caused to lose a lucrative and profitable position, and
was put to great trouble, expense, annoyance and inconvenience in and about
obtaining new employment and was caused to be without employment for a long
period of time ....
235 Ala. at 377, 178 So. at 895.
Commentators also suggest that a job is a property right protected by the Constitution
against unjust employer deprivation. See Weyand, Present Status of Individual Employee
Rights, N.Y.U. 22nd Annual Conference on Labor 171, 181-84, 215 (1970) (" 'For the vast
majority of men their most valuable property is not their TV set, their home, or their car,
but their job, their profession, their franchise, their contracts. The right to use their labor
and skill has become their most valuable property right.' ") (footnote omitted); see also
Glendon & Lev, Changes in the Bonding of the Employment Relationship: An Essay on
the New Property, 20 B.C.L. REV. 457 (1979). This is distinctly a minority view. Courts
show no movement away from the historical doctrine that the job belongs to the employer
who creates it and employees, like invitees, are present only at the employer's sufferance.
85. Merten v. Nathan, 108 Wis. 2d 205, 211, 321 N.W.2d 173, 177 (1982).
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ages and damages for pain and suffering is most appropriate for
wrongful discharge injuries. The Brockmeyer court conceded that
the "primary concern in . . . [wrongful discharge] actions is to
make the wronged employee 'whole.' "86 Nevertheless, the court's
holding that contract damages are the measure of recovery contra-
dicts its previous statement and infers that the court's determina-
tion to compensate the wronged employee is only theoretical. In
the majority of cases, fired employees, who basically suffer the col-
lapse of their entire world, derive little benefit from mere rein-
statement and backpay and are.not made "whole" again.8 7
The Brockmeyer court's tendency to only pay lip service to
the notions of compensation is also reflected in its response to the
employer's arguments. The court rejected the employer's conten-
tion that recognizing an action for wrongful discharge usurps legis-
lative power and that modifications of the traditional rule are "a
policy question within the special province of the legislature."'88
When presented with the same issue, the Court of Appeals of New
York adopted a contrary position. In Murphy v. American Home
Products Corp.,89 the court refused to recognize a cause of action
for abusive discharge, but rather deferred to the state legislature to
institute such a change in the law. The Brockmeyer majority noted
the Murphy holding9" but stressed that "the legislature has not
and cannot cover every type of wrongful termination that violates
a clear mandate of public policy." 91 The court also stated that the
common law is most "susceptible of growth and adaptation to new
86. 113 Wis. 2d at 575, 335 N.W.2d at 841.
87. For a discussion of the tort remedies available to the abusively discharged em-
ployee, see Blades, supra note 84.
88. 113 Wis. 2d at 576, 335 N.W.2d at 841.
89. 58 N.Y.2d 293, 448 N.E.2d 86, 461 N.Y.S.2d 232 (1983). In Murphy, a discharged
employee brought an action for abusive discharge, prima facie tort, intentional infliction of
emotional distress, breach of contract, and age discrimination. The court refused to recog-
nize a cause of action for abusive discharge and concluded that modification of the at-will
rule is best "accomplished through a principled statutory scheme." Id. at 302, 448 N.E.2d at
90, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 236. The court explained its position:
The Legislature has infinitely greater resources and procedural means to discern
the public will, to examine the variety of pertinent considerations, to elicit the
views of the various segments of the community that would be directly affected
and in any event critically interested, and to investigate and anticipate the im-
pact of imposition of such liability.
Id. at 302, 448 N.E.2d at 89, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 236.
The New York court believed that the legislative branch is best suited to establish stan-
dards for the multifarious employment settings and the broad spectrum. of discharge
situations.
90. 113 Wis. 2d at 572 n.13, 335 N.W.2d at 840 n.13
91. Id. at 576, 335 N.W.2d at 841-42.
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circumstances and situations."92
In the concurring opinion in Brockmeyer, Justice Day de-
parted from the majority and took a position similar to the one
articulated by the Murphy court. He believed that specific legisla-
tion should work out wrongful discharge rights and define the pen-
alties for their violation.9 3 Justice Day further stated, "[t]he legis-
lature has the advantage of being able to hold' hearings, conduct
investigations, and determine if there are further rights that need
to be created to protect the 'at-will' employee. '94
Closer analysis reveals, however, that neither the concurring
nor the majority opinion arrived at the optimum conclusions. The
majority's finding that the public policy exception does not usurp
legislative prerogative but rather serves to "advance an already de-
clared legislative policy,''95 appears valid. Wrongful termination
does seem to embrace diverse situations and the concept of public
policy appears to be equally varied. As a result, the courts may be
best suited to apply judicial standards on a case by case basis.
Nevertheless, if we accept the majority's position we cannot readily
accept its restrictive definition of public policy. The court assumed
two contrary positions at once and thereby neutralized its own im-
pact on the law: it modified the at-will doctrine because extant leg-
islation is inadequate and then limited itself to policy that has al-
ready been legislated.
With regard to the concurrence, Justice Day conceded that the
state legislature promulgated numerous standards and protections
for the employee and that federal law provides additional safe-
guards. 6 What the concurrence fails to note is that a large sector
of the work force remains unprotected despite this abundant legis-
lation. If the contrary position is assumed, cases like Brockmeyer
would not arise so persistently. Additionally, the concurrence of-
fered no persuasive reason why courts are incapable of devising a
workable standard to limit the application of the at-will doctrine.
The problem of tempering the effect of the at-will rule is a
treacherous tug of war with many ropes extending in all different
directions. Unfortunately, the Brockmeyer court isolated only
some of the many interests involved. In addition to jurisdictions
92. Id. at 576, 335 N.W.2d at 842 (citation omitted).
93. Id. at 581, 335 N.W.2d at 844.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 576, 335 N.W.2d at 842.
96. Id. at 580, 335 N.W.2d at 843.
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that defer to the legislature,97 some courts still adhere to more for-
malistic contractual tenets and favor the employers' interests in
running their business as they see fit." This anachronistic refusal
to modify the rule neglects to afford the employee a necessary
sense of permanence and ignores important interests of the public
at large. It is the public's right to enjoy a society composed of em-
ployment relationships in which the fear of termination does not
provoke people into committing acts that violate a criminal code,
the constitution, and a statute, or does not force an employee to
remain silent while an unsafe product is injected into the market. 9
Finally, the courts themselves are extremely interested in the out-
come of the problem. The courts must protect the public interests
and at the same time devise a viable means of warding off a deluge
of cases, some possibly frivolous, brought by disgruntled former
employees. Striking such a balance, however, is difficult. Although
the courts need to recognize the at-will employees' right to job se-
curity, they must at the same time attempt to avoid a situation
where they second guess business decisions and interfere in the
work place.
In response to these concerns, the Brockmeyer court opined
that "a narrowly circumscribed public policy exception properly
97. See, e.g., Murphy v. American Home Products Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293, 448 N.E.2d 86,
461 N.Y.S.2d 232 (1983). For a discussion of Murphy, see supra note 89 and accompanying
text.
98. See Hinrichs v. Tranquilaire Hosp., 352 So. 2d 1130 (Ala. 1977) (The Alabama Su-
preme Court did not allow an employee terminated for refusing to falsify medical records to
sue for wrongful discharge because the public policy exception is simply "too nebulous a
standard," Id. at 1131); Johnson v. National Beef Packing Co., 220 Kan. 52, 551 P.2d 779
(1976) (The Kansas Supreme Court held that there was no contract, either express or im-
plied, for a fixed term of employment between the employer and the former employee. The.
court's holding is contrary to the Michigan approach of Toussiant. The Johnson court re-
jected the employee's contention that the company's policy manual which stated that "[n]o
employee shall be dismissed without just cause" constituted a contract, id. at 54, 551 P.2d at
781. The court regarded the manual as a unilateral statement of policy, and, since the par-
ties did not bargain for its terms, the benefits conferred were mere gratuities. The court
stated that "an agreement to give permanent employment simply means to give a steady job
of some permanence . . . ." Id., 551 P.2d at 782). See also Demarco v. Publix Super Mar-
kets, Inc., 384 So. 2d 1253, 1254 (Fla. 1980) (The court stated "'[W]here the term of em-
ployment is discretionary with either party or indefinite, then either party for any reason
may terminate it at any time and no action may be maintained for breach of the employ-
ment contract' "). For a discussion of employment at-will in Florida and Florida's adherence
to the rule, see Note, Employment at Will: A Proposal to Adopt the Public Policy Excep-
tion in Florida, 34 U. FLA. L. REV. 614 (1982).
99. For a discussion of the plight of the employee who must face the choice of exposing
an employer's wrongdoing or of being fired, see Comment, Protecting the Private Sector At
Will Employee who "Blows the Whistle": A Cause of Action Based Upon Determinants of
Public Policy, 1977 Wis. L. REV. 777.
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balances the interests of employees, employers and the public."' 00
The weakness in this argument is that a public policy exception.
based on constitutional or statutory grounds may be too narrow to
protect anyone (except perhaps the courts) from unwanted litiga-
tion. In fact, the Brockmeyer approach is not a vast improvement
on the courts that completely refuse to modify the rule.
Justice Day, in his concurring opinion, suggested the contrary
proposition that the new exception not only creates an unstable
job market, but also promotes litigation: "more and more dis-
charges that at present are known to be non-actionable will be ve-
hicles to test the ingenuity of the advocate to find some constitu-
tional, or statutory or regulatory provision that can be cited in a
complaint for 'wrongful discharge.' "101
Justice Day's prediction, however, is illogical and ignores the
specific result of the Brockmeyer case. Faced with Brockmeyer as
precedent, an advocate for the wrongfully discharged employee
must diligently hunt through the constitution and statutes in
hopes of discovering the relevant and applicable expression of pub-
lic policy. If this quest proves fruitful, the court can accept or re-
ject the provision cited in the complaint as a relevant expression of
public policy. In fact, Brockmeyer supported his argument with
statutory provisions. He contended that Dun & Bradstreet's ac-
tions violated a statute that prbhibits wilfully and maliciously in-
juring others in their "reputation, trade, business or profession"10 2
and a statute that prohibits the use of "threats, intimidation, force
or coercion" to keep a person from working.'03 The court con-
100. 113 Wis. 2d at 574, 335 N.W.2d at 841.
101. Id. at 580-81, 335 N.W.2d at 844.
102. Wis. Stat. § 134.01 (1975) (cited in Brockmeyer, 113 Wis. 2d at 577 n.18, 335
N.W.2d at 842 n.18). The statute states the following:
134.01 Injury to business; restraint of will
Any 2 or more persons who shall combine, associate, agree, mutually under-
take or concert together for the purpose of wilfully or maliciously injuring an-
other in his reputation, trade, business or profession by any means whatever, or
for the purpose of maliciously compelling another to do or perform any act
against his will, or preventing or hindering another from doing or performing
any lawful act shall be punished by imprisonment in the county jail not more
than one year or by fine not exceeding $500.
Wis. Stat. § 134.01 (1975).
103. Wis. Stat. § 134.03 (1975) (cited in Brockmeyer, 113 Wis. 2d at 577 n.19, 335
N.W.2d at 842 n.19). The text of the statute reads as follows:
134.03 Preventing pursuit of work
Any person who by threats, intimidation, force or coercion of any kind shall
hinder or prevent any other person from engaging in or continuing any lawful
work or employment, either for himself or as a wage worker, or who shall at-
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cluded that there was "no evidence that Dun & Bradstreet engaged
in any behavior of this sort,"1 ° and that to hold to the contrary
"would completely abolish the at-will doctrine."' 0 5 The court fur-
ther expressed its intent to only recognize public policy reflected in
the constitution and statutes and it stated that "[w]hile Dun &
Bradstreet's discharge of Brockmeyer may have constituted bad
faith, which is what the jury in this case presumably believed, its
actions did not contravene the policies [of the statutes]. '06
In addition, Brockmeyer cited a statute in support of his con-
tention that his employer was asking him to commit perjury. 1 7
The court rejected this stating that, "[T]he record is devoid of any
evidence demonstrating that Dun & Bradstreet asked Brockmeyer
to lie."1 8 The court, however, admitted that "an inference can be
drawn from this record that Dun & Bradstreet was concerned that
Brockmeyer would tell the truth if asked to testify at proceedings
concerning his former secretary's sex discrimination claim."10 9 Not-
tempt to so hinder or prevent shall be punished by fine not exceeding $100 or by
imprisonment in the county jail not more than 6 months, or by both fine and
imprisonment in the discretion of the court. Nothing herein contained shall be
construed to prohibit any person or persons off of the premises of such lawful
work or employment from recommending, advising or persuading others by
peaceful means to refrain from working at a place where a strike or lockout is in
progress.
104. 113 Wis. 2d at 578, 335 N.W.2d at 842.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Wis. Stat. § 946.31(1) (1975) (cited in Brockmeyer, 113 Wis. 2d at 578 n.20, 335
N.W.2d at 842 n.20). The full text appears as follows:
946.31 Perjury
(1) Whoever under oath or affirmation orally makes a false material state-
ment which the person does not believe to be true, in any matter, cause, action
or proceeding, before any of the following, whether legally constituted or exercis-
ing powers as if legally constituted, is guilty of a Class D felony:
(a) A court;
(b) A magistrate;
(c) A judge, referee or court commissioner;
(d) An administrative agency or arbitrator authorized by statute to determine
issues of fact;
(e) A notary public while taking testimony for use in an action or proceeding
pending in court;
(f) An officer authorized to conduct inquests of the dead;
(g) A grand jury;
(h) A legislative body or committee.
(2) It is not a defense to a prosecution under this action that the perjured
testimony was corrected or retracted.
Wis. Stat. § 946.31 (1975).
108. 113 Wis. 2d at 578, 335 N.W.2d at 842.
109. Id. at 578, 335 N.W.2d at 843.
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withstanding this inference, the court refused to characterize the
company's actions as asking the employee to commit perjury. In-
stead the court portrayed the behavior as a company "discharging
an employee because his testimony may be contrary to an em-
ployer's interests,"1 ' an activity that is a "far cry" from perjury
and that possesses no "clearly defined mandate of public policy"
prohibiting it."' Under the circumstances, the "ingenuity of the
advocate" could not make the exception work for the client. This
finding tends to prove that, at least in Wisconsin, Justice Day's
prediction will not occur.
The concurring opinion's alternate reason for opposing the ex-
ception is as equally unpersuasive. Justice Day claimed that the
majority's modification of the at-will rule injures the small busi-
ness person because "settlements will often be made of meritless
claims to avoid the high cost of litigation."1 It is certainly possi-
ble that there will be situations when the employee utilizes the
public policy exception as a form of blackmail and successfully ex-
acts a generous settlement. Nevertheless, it seems more likely that
many wrongfully discharged employees who, in all honesty, cannot
come up with the citable statutory or constitutional provision, will
discover that this restrictive exception shuts the courthouse
doors." 3 Although the trial courts may encounter situations that
fall within the public policy exception, the Brockmeyer opinion
weighs heavily against any action proceeding beyond the complaint
stage.11
110. Id. at 578-79, 335 N.W.2d at 843.
111. Id. at 578, 335 N.W.2d at 843.
112. Id. at 580-81, 335 N.W.2d at 844.
113. There may be cases where the facts fit within the statutory language. In these
cases, extensive prelitigation expenses may force settlements of meritorious claims, espe-
cially when the employer is a small businessperson without the capital needed to even begin
to defend the suit. Nevertheless, the Brockmeyer decision decreases the likelihood that an
employee will prevail at trial. The court spoke in terms of protecting the employee, see
supra text accompanying notes 85-92, yet it made two determinations that virtually fore-
close the wrongfully discharged employee's opportunities for adequate redress.
First, the finding that only contract damages are recoverable in suits for wrongful dis-
charge precludes lower-level employees from obtaining adequate counsel. See supra text
accompanying notes 78-82. Second, the finding that relevant public policy must be con-
tained in a statute or the constitution limits the protection all employees receive, because it
is evident that even if a statute is found, the trial courts when faced with the weight of the
Brockmeyer opinion won't construe its provisions liberally enough to include the discharge.
See supra text accompanying notes 101-10.
114. See supra note 113. See also, Note, supra note 78.
"But the scope of this protection is substantially narrowed by preemption doc-
trine: in many cases the legislation that provides the plaintiff with a source of
public policy also provides a statutory remedy, the availability of which has been
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IV. CONCLUSION
The Brockmeyer opinion articulates the crucial questions a
court or legislature must face when attempting to devise a worka-
ble exception to the at-will rule. Until all employees enjoy the pro-
tections given to civil servants and union members who can only be
fired for "just cause," courts should not restrict themselves to the
recognition of public policies expressed exclusively by the constitu-
tion or statutes. Courts should also not limit the wrongfully dis-
charged employee to contractual remedies which keep the lower-
level employees out of court and fail to redress their injuries. In
addition, the courts are obligated to refuse to sanction misconduct
motivated by bad faith. Wisconsin did not recognize this obliga-
tion. The Brockmeyer court found the employer's behavior indica-
tive of bad faith, but not violative of public policy. In contrast, the
conclusion in Monge v. Beebe,11 5 which recognized that retaliations
motivated by bad faith, malice or retaliatory desires are not in the
public interest, is more sound and adaptable."'
If indeed the concept of public policy is as "amorphous" as the
Brockmeyer court insists it is, the narrowing of it totally defeats its
effectiveness. Such results are often rooted in the fallacious as-
sumption that the employee's interests and the employer's inter-
ests are eternally at odds. A contented and secure work force could
promote as much growth and expansion as an unrestrained em-
ployer. Next to the complete abolition of the rule, the broader ap-
proaches to its modification at least look toward this productive
symbiosis. 117 Ultimately it is the broader approach that affords
protection to the more nebulous societal values that are not, and
may never be, spelled out in a specific amendment or statutory
provision.
AMY D. RONNER*
held by some courts to bar a common law claim for wrongful dis-
charge .... [S]tatutory remedies are often less satisfactory than those available
under common law ...."
Note, supra note 78 at 1946-47.
115. 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974). For a discussion on Monge, see supra notes 28-
30 and accompanying text.
116. Id. at 134, 316 A.2d at 552. However, Monge was not entitled to recover damages
attributable to mental suffering.
117. See supra text accompanying notes 23-37.
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